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JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY
Myres S. McDougal*

T

HE search for a jurisprudence, a theory about law, appropriate
for a free society, has long been a subject of concern to legal scholars. In attempting to make some modest contribution to this search,
the major themes and arguments I will explore are as follows: first, the
intimate interrelations of law and public order in any community;
second, the intellectual functions required of a useful jurisprudence or
theory about law; third, the most important contributions of past
schools of jurisprudence to a useful theory about law; fourth, the basic
pattern of a policy-oriented approach to inquiry about law; fifth, and
finally, some of the conditions for promoting a public order of freedom
and human dignity.
It will be obvious that to touch even briefly upon so many vast topics,
one must perforce be somewhat abstract. It may be recalled that Professor Thomas Reed Powell, a famous professor of constitutional law
at Harvard, once said that a man has a good legal mind if he can think
about something to which something is attached without thinking about
the thing which is attached. If, therefore, we are to employ good legal
minds, we must remember that all levels of abstraction, when the terms
admit of empirical specification, are necessary to comprehensive and
effective communication.
THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF LAw AND PUBLIC ORDER

To understand the intimate interrelations of law and public order
we must be clear about what we mean by both law and public order.
Too frequently law is still thought of as something that is written in a
book-as rules on a piece of paper or the words that came to us in
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1787. On a deeper level of understanding, we know that this conception
of law as a body of rules is hopelessly inadequate. Whatever our roles
-whether we are judges, other officials, effective power holders, advocates, scholars, or simply members of the community-we are interested in more than rules. We are interested in decisions, what's done,
the consequences of the making and application of rules for human
beings. Indeed, many of us today prefer to think of law as a process, a
process of authoritative decision.
In other words, if one thinks in terms of decision, he thinks of judges
and other officials, established in appropriate institutions and with effective power at their disposal, responding to controversies which arise in
social process, and resolving these controversies in accordance with
community expectations about how such controversies should be resolved. A decision is a choice made in response to competing demands
arising from social process and having consequences for future social
process. It is part of a continuing interaction, involving many participants. The rules which are sometimes called "law" are but shorthand
expressions of community expectations, and as instruments of communication, have the same inadequacies as any shorthand.
When we reflect, we know that rules are not given; they are continually being made and remade. The important questions are: (1) who
makes the rules; (2) who applies the rules; (3) for whom; (4) with what
degree of conformity with basic community expectations; and (5) with
what consequences for community public order. Every experienced
lawyer knows also that rules commonly travel in pairs of opposites.
Even our constitutional principles are continuously being created and
recreated in pairs of opposites. Thus, one set of principles confers
power, competence, upon officials: these principles are illustrated by
the grants to the Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court or by
the allocation of power between the federal government and the states.
Whereas another set of principles purports to impose limits upon the
competences so granted: these principles are illustrated in the Bill of
Rights and the specific prohibitions of the Constitution. Any application of these principles to the facts of a particular controversy obviously
requires a very delicate balancing of many different community
interests.
Looking more closely, for example, at the allocation of competences
between the federal government and the states, one of the principal
purposes of the Convention of 1787 was to make this nation one. The
various states had refused to abide by the treaties of the central govern-
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ment. The central government could not even enforce the treaty
designed to consolidate our freedom. Hence, in the making and enforcing of treaties, the Constitution conferred a broad competence
upon the central government, to the exclusion of the states. Still the
tenth amendment sought to preserve a federal form of government by
reserving to the states the powers not delegated to the nation. The
result, doctrinally, is that with respect to any particular controversy,
if the subject-matter is within the scope of the "treaty-power" it is not
among the competences reserved to the states; if, on the other hand,
the subject-matter is within the reservation of the tenth amendment,
it is not within the scope of the treaty-power. Fortunately, our established decision-makers have uniformly interpreted this complementary
structure of principles in favor of a strong national competence.
A similar complementarity in principle pervades even the very conception of judicial competence. This is expressed in the familiar distinction between "legal" and "political" questions. When a court wishes to
decide a question, it calls the question "legal"; when it wishes to avoid
a question, or to bounce it to another branch of the government, it
calls the question "political" or, as in the recent Sabbatinol case, finds
that it involves an "act of state."
If we shift from national to international law, we find a similar allperasive complementarity in principle. Corresponding to our "federal
power"--"tenth amendment' dichotomy, is the distinction between
matters of "international concern" and of "domestic jurisdiction." If
a matter is of "international concern," the general community of states,
through both international organization and unilateral action of particular states, may make and apply law for the matter. On the other
hand if a matter is of "domestic jurisdiction," the general community
is not supposed to bother with it. In comparable vein, states and international governmental organizations are said to be appropriate "subjects of international law," whereas individuals and private associations
are not; attacks upon the territorial integrity and political independence
of states are not permissible "aggression" under the United Nations
Charter, but a use of the military instrument in response to, or
reasonably imminent anticipation of, such attacks is permissible "selfdefense."
This complementarity in principle, which could be documented
in every major field, is not an accident. It exists because the in1 Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 US. 398 (1964).
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terests, which the principles express, are themselves complementary. Our contemporary communities, whether earth-space, regional,
or national, do in fact exhibit a plural society-a society in which
many different groups, of varying functional organization, assert demands for values and enjoy varying expectations about the conditions
under which these demands can be achieved. The legal processes which
these communities maintain for accommodating these competing demands quite naturally formulate principles which express the perspectives and interests of all component groups.
A "community" is a group of people, organized in varying degree
on a geographic basis and affected by interdependences or interdetermination in the social processes by which they seek values. A more
complete description of any community would outline the participants
(group and individual), the range of values sought, the situations or
interaction, the base values at the disposal of different participants, the
strategies employed in different contexts, and finally, the outcome
achieved in the shaping and sharing of values.
In any particular community it is possible to observe among its
constituent social processes a process of effective power, i.e., decisions of community-wide impact are in fact made and put into controlling effect. Complete description would require identification of
effective elites and reference to all phases of social process. In such
description, these effective power decisions would be seen to be of two
different kinds. Some such decisions are taken from simple expediency,
or sheer naked power, and enforced by severe deprivation or high indulgences, whether the community members like them or not. Other
decisions, however, are taken in accordance with community expectations about how such decisions should be taken: they are taken by
established decision-makers, in recognized structures of authority, related to community expectations of common interest, and supported
by enough effective power to be put into effect in consequential degree.
It is these latter decisions, those taken in accordance with community expectations and enforced by organized community coercion,
which are, from the perspectives we recommend, most appropriately
called "law." In this conception law is, thus, a process of decision in
which authority and control are conjoined. Without authority, decision
is but arbitrary coercion, naked power; without control, it is often
illusion.
When closely examined, the decisions which we describe as "authoritative" may also be seen to be of two different kinds. There are, first,
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the constitutive decisions, the decisions which establish the most comprehensive process of authoritative decision, and, secondly, the whole
flow of particular decisions which come out of the constitutive process
for regulating the various community value processes. The constitutive
decisions are those which identify the authorized decision-makers,
establish appropriate institutional structures, prescribe the basic policies
to guide particular decisions, confer a basis of power necessary to effectiveness, provide for economic procedures, and secure the continuous
performance of the different types of functions (intelligence-gathering,
recommendation, prescription, innovation, etc.) which are necessary to
the making and application of general community policy. The particular decisions which emerge from this constitutive process determine the
protected features of all other value processes, whether relating to
wealth, human rights, enlightenment, health and welfare, rectitude,
and so on.
It is these legally protected features of the various community value
processes to which we refer by "public order." In the broadest sense,
because authority builds upon and protects authority, even the kind
of constitutive process a community establishes, as a protected feature
of the larger process of effective power, might be regarded as a part of
its "public order."
The kind of a constitutive process a community can establish and
maintain is of course critical for the freedom, security, and abundance
of the public order it can achieve. Too often the maintenance of an appropriate constitutive process is impeded by misunderstanding, even
among scholars, of the comprehensive nature of such a process. Our
own Constitution is not confined to a few words on parchment and its
making did not stop short, as some still seem to assume, in 1787. Our
effective Constitution today is established by our living, contemporary
expectations about all the various features of our most comprehensive
process of decision. These expectations are created not merely by an
embossed document or a few judicial decisions, but by a whole flow of
relevant communications, beginning even prior to 1787 and coming
down to date. The task of a contemporary interpreter is to examine and
assess this entire flow of prior communication for the closest possible
approximation to the genuine shared subjectivities of our present community members as to what their Constitution really provides on basic
issues. Some of the crucial questions are: What are our genuine shared
expectations about an appropriate division of power between the legislature, the executive, and the courts? With respect to foreign affairs?
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With respect to the many different types of internal affairs? What are
our expectations about an appropriate allocation between the states
and the central government? How realistic, and complete in reference,
are manifest expectations? Do they take into account what the conditions even of survival in the contemporary world require by way of
central government? Do they take into account the decentralization
indispensable to the maintenance of freedom? How do we most effectively supplement the complementarities, gaps, and ambiguities in official communications by reference to basic community policies in demanded public order?
Shifting our attention from the national to the world arena, we find
an even greater confusion about constitutive process and its relation to
public order. Because of the absence of highly centralized legislative
and executive institutions, many people assume that there is no constitutive process on a global scale. They do not see that there are in fact
(1) established decision-makers (located in both international and national structures of authority), (2) a high efficiency in the unorganized
interactions of these decision-makers, (3) many policies reflecting a
clarified common interest and wide acceptance around the world, (4)
effective sanctions in reciprocity and retaliation for the enforcement of
decisions, (5) a considerable agreement about permissible procedures,
and (6) a continuous flow of decisions which make and apply law on a
transnational scale.
The most dramatic confusion about constitutive process in the larger
arena relates to the law of outer space. Many friends have laughed at
my study of this area. "How could you," they say, "write a thousand
page book on such an imaginary subject?" "Why," they add, "there are
no rules about outer space and nobody authorized to make such rules."
Such comments, of course, betray a complete ignorance of the interrelations of effective power, law, and public order. A moment's reflection should suggest that the same people who have effective power with
respect to earth-bound processes also have effective power in outer
space. The most comprehensive perspectives of these people-their
demands for values, their identifications with others, and their expectations about the conditions affecting the achievement of their
values-have caused them to establish and maintain the rudiments of
constitutive process and public order on earth. To expect that they
will not project comparable policies and institutions for the regulation
of their interactions in space would be to disregard human nature
and the factors which affect decision.
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The design of all this illustration is to document the deep interdependences-even identities-of community process, law, and public
order. What is being insisted is that, while the people who have effective power in a community maintain law-authoritative decision-for
the securing of their common interests, authority in turn becomes itself
a base of effective power and feeds control, thus establishing a most
intimate relationship between control and authority. Similarly, it is
suggested that a comparable relationship exists between constitutive
process and public order: the economy and effectiveness of the constitutive process a community can achieve vitally affects the freedom,
security, and abundance of its public order; the quality of the public
order a community attains, in turn, affects the viability of the constitutive process it can maintain. The most important lesson which we
would draw from this documentation of interrelationship and interdependence is that one who seeks to affect the future course of decision
and public order must also seek to affect the basic perspectives, the most
deeply rooted pre-dispositions, of the effective elites of the community
with which he is concerned.
THE INTELLECTUAL FUNcriONs REQUIRED OF A USEFUL

JURISPRUDENCE OR THEORY ABoUT
LAw

We couple the words "theory about law" with jurisprudence in order
to emphasize that by jurisprudence we refer to theory which is useful
to an observer, or scholar, who is primarily concerned with enlightenment about the whole community process, which includes the relationship between authoritative decision and other processes. The contrast
is with "theory of law," which is the theory actually employed by decision-makers in obtaining and justifying effects within power processes
and is one of the variables about which the scholar seeks enlightenment.
Occasionally, good theory about law may be found useful by decisionmakers and, hence, be made also a part of theory of law; similarly, good
theory of law may sometimes be sufficiently precise and relevant to
serve some purposes of the scholar in his more comprehensive inquiry.
However, it is important to keep clear the differences in observational
standpoint and purpose which may attend the use of the same or comparable words.
The principal social function of legal scholarship, law teaching and
inquiry, is commonly assumed to be that of transmitting the more
fundamental community perspectives about law and public order from
one generation to the next. This function includes both the inculcation
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of general understanding and training in specific skills, as well as at
least a modest responsibility for improvement of the heritage. The
question is by what kind of theory can the performance of this function
best be facilitated.
It may require emphasis that everyone, whether he is explicitly conscious of it or not, has a jurisprudence. We all have expectations and
make assumptions about the course of future decision and have our
notions, realistic or not, about the factors that affect decision. Similarly,
we all have our community identifications and contribute our preferences and prejudices to the total demands for public order. One task of
a relevant jurisprudence is to bring all these vague and implicit assumptions to a clear focus for critical examination and appraisal.
It may be suggested that the more important intellectual functions
of a relevant and comprehensive jurisprudence are three-fold: first, to
establish clarity about observational standpoint; second, to delimit a
realistic focus of inquiry; and, third, to facilitate performance of all the
various intellectual tasks necessary to both enlightenment and rational
decision. What we mean by each of these references can be briefly
explained.
Observational standpoint is important because it affects perception
and the performance of relevant intellectual tasks. The objectives in
inquiry of the scholar, the official decision maker, the professional advocate, the effective power holder, and the community member may be
very different. If the scholarly observer does not assume perspectives
different from those of the community member making claims or of
the authoritative decision maker who responds to such claims, he can
have no criteria for appraising the rationality in terms of common
interest of either the claims or decision. The failure to recognize this
difference is, for example, the simple obfuscation which underlies the
frequent false contraposition of "national" and "international" interests
in inquiry about international law.
An appropriate delimitation of the focus, or subject-matter, of inquiry
is important because it affects how problems are formulated and, hence,
both the effectiveness of proposed solutions and the consequentiality
of inquiry. When inquiry is focused only upon rules-perspectives-to
the exclusion of actual practices-operations-there can be no assurance
that it will have any relevance to what is actually happening in a community. When considerations of authority are overemphasized, with
relative neglect of control or effective power, the outcomes of inquiry
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may have little bearing upon the future course of law and public order.
When law is conceived only as rules applied by courts, there may be
disastrous neglect of how rules are made, as well as of other important
aspects of the comprehensive process of authoritative decision. When
law is regarded as something autonomous and distinct from community
policy, no intellectual tools are afforded for relating decisions to the
events in social process to which they are a response and, in turn, affect.
When neat distinctions are made between national and international
law, and national law is regarded as isolated from the larger world about
us, it becomes impossible either to account for many important factors
which affect decision or rationally to clarify policies for the various
interpenetrating communities which in fact embrace the activities of
man. A viable jurisprudence, as will be developed below, must achieve
a clear focus upon processes of authoritative decision, as composed both
of perspectives and operations and as combining both authority and
control, and locate such decision processes, not merely within the arbitrarily isolated social interstices of a single national community, but
also in the whole global or earth-space community which both affects
and is affected by its component lesser communities.
The appropriate specification of a comprehensive set of intellectual
tasks, or skills, is important because the range of tasks performed in
inquiry determines the relevance of inquiry for policy. When the task
of legal scholarship is conceived as largely that of making logical derivations from allegedly given and unequivocal rules, the outcomes are
likely to be barren exercises in black-letter abstractions. Explicit attempts to clarify community policy which do not at the same time
systematically pursue other tasks, such as the description of past trends
in decision and the analysis of factors affecting decision, may be stillborn. Descriptions of past trends in decision which are not explicitly
related to social processes and community policies may afford no bases
for comparisons either through time or across nation-state boundaries.
The scientific study of factors affecting decision, when not guided by
and related to preferred community policies may, as demonstrated in
the era of the American legal realists, involve enormous costs and yield
few benefits. The prediction of future trends in decision by the mere
extrapolation of past trends, without the discipline of scientific study
of changing conditions, more often produces illusion rather than genuine forecast. In the confusion of all the other tasks, that of deliberately
inventing and evaluating policy alternatives is too often lost. A viable
jurisprudence must, again, provide theory and specify procedures for
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the systematic, disciplined, and contextual performance of a comprehensive range of policy and relevant intellectual tasks.
AN APPRAISAL OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF
PAST SCHOOLS OF JURISPRUDENCE

We begin with the natural law school. The most important contributions of this school down through the centuries are in its insistence
upon the relevance of goals and its appeals from the realities of naked
power to authority. It is common knowledge how much these notions
have aided the development of national constitutions and the birth
and development of international law. Unfortunately, however, the
technique of goal clarification exemplified by this school has too often
been simply that of logical derivation and the premises from which its
devotees have sought to derive authority have too often been transempirical, rather than empirical, in reference. The origins even of law,
all the more of theory about law, are still quite dim, largely unexplored
by scholarship, but it would appear that in the beginnings of what we
call civilization, notions of family authority, religion, morality, law, and
various practical arts were all mixed up together. Though secular notions of authority began to appear with the emergence of cities in the
great river valleys, the dominant appeals for authority in the natural
law tradition have throughout history been to transempirical sources,
and this would appear to obtain still today. Similarly, adherents to
natural law schools, perhaps because of their preoccupation with
transempirical sources, have seldom shown a great concern for the close
examination of decisions or the location of decisions in secular social
and community processes.
The important contribution of the historical school of jurisprudence,
arising in Europe and spreading to this country and in measure a revolt
against the transempiricism of the natural lawyers, was its location of
law firmly in secular community process. For adherents to this school,
the authority of law was to be found in custom, behavior, the flow of
peoples' habits: law was like poetry or music, it sprang from the souls
and common wills of people. It will be observed that some of these
notions are scarcely less mystical than those of the natural lawyers. Unfortunately, also, the exemplars of the historical school, perhaps because
of their concern for aggregate processes, never achieved a clear focus on
decision and its relation to social processes. Hence, they never devised a
method, other than purely anecdotal, for even the historical task. The
potentialities of goal clarification they minimized because of a certain
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fatalism-what had been would continue to be--and a corresponding
belittlement of the role of legislatures.
The most significant contribution of the analytical school, which has
dominated thinking in England and the United States for more than
a century, is in its very timid approach to the conception of authoritative
decision. Reacting against both the transempirical notions of the natural
lawyers and the vague diffuseness of the historical school, the devotees
of this jurisprudence have sought to define law as the rules prescribed
and applied by distinctive institutions of authority. Sometimes emphasis
has been placed upon the commands of putative sovereigns, sometimes
upon the rules made and applied by judges, and sometimes even upon
the prescriptions announced by legislators. The one consistent emphasis, however, is that upon rules, as distinguished from actual choices or
operations; and another almost equally consistent emphasis is that
these rules are something unique or autonomous, different from community policy. In this absence of a clear notion of authoritative decision and of its function in social process, it is not surprising that the
intellectual task most performed and recommended by the analytical
jurists is that of logical derivation. When it is assumed that one set of
rules can simultaneously describe what has been, what will be, and what
ought to be, there remains, of course, little place for more comprehensive or intensive inquiry.
The principal innovation of the sociological school, originating in
Europe during the past century and spreading to the English speaking
countries in this, was in its emphasis upon the scientific study of explanatory factors. Improvements in techniques of inquiry and knowledge, first about the physical sciences and later about the social sciences,
gave scholars a new incentive to attempt to bring scientific skills to bear
upon the study of law. Some of the European representatives of this new
aspiration remained, however, infected with much of the mysticism of
the historical school and few of them came much closer than had the
analytical school to a realistic understanding of a comprehensive process
of authoritative decision and its relation to public order. Even the
most creative, such as Max Weber, sought to keep their legal and
sociological inquiries in separate compartments. Lacking a clear focus
of inquiry and ignoring the dependence of the scientific task of inquiry
upon all the other tasks, especially that of goal clarification, their
permanent contributions to knowledge have not been as great as might
have been hoped. In this country Dean Pound for some decades made
eloquent and articulate demands for a "continuously more efficacious
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social engineering," but his own conception of law never fully escaped
from the confines of judicial techniques and rules and he never elaborated his conception of "interests" into a comprehensive and homogenous set of categories in aid of performance of the various relevant
intellectual tasks.
The abiding contribution of the American legal realist school, which
built upon the insights of the sociologists, was in its discovering of the
importance of a clear focus on decision. The late Judge Jerome Frank,
long a member of the Yale law faculty, was among the first to refer to
law as a process of authoritative decision, but a comparable emphasis
was both explicit and implicit among many other scholars. This emphasis was, unfortunately, sometimes carried so far, under the influence of
a behaviorist psychology, that the "perspectives" or "rules" element in
decision was largely ignored in an exaggerated concern for "operations,"
factual choices. Similarly, though most of the adherents to this movement were deeply concerned about the consequences of decision, about
the impact of law upon human beings, few of them had either a comprehensive set of value categories, or a systematic set of appropriate
procedures for goal clarification, to aid them in the appraisal of decisions. The abstractions which they formulated were largely low-level
abstractions, and the problems with which they worked, in the absence
of a comprehensive guiding theory, were related to each other only
anecdotally. Early death unhappily, took an exceptionally heavy toll
among the members of this group, and it would appear that the whole
movement, save to the extent that it has become a part of our common
thought, is now in rigor mortis.
The one significant contribution of the Scandinavian realists would
appear to reside in their development of the art of verbal windmill
jousting. The members of this group have been deadly bent upon destroying any lingering deference any of us might have about any alleged
unique "validity" or "binding character" of legal rules. For many of us,
fortunately, this is a work of supererogation. For others the work of the
Scandinavians may serve a liberating purpose, freeing energies for more
constructive tasks.
A broad conspectus of contemporary views in the English speaking
countries would suggest that both natural law and analytical jurisprudence are still very strong. Unable to focus clearly upon law as decision, proponents of natural law insist upon an alleged impossibility of
distinguishing "is" and "ought," and commingle all the different,
relevant intellectual tasks into one "big, blooming, buzzing confusion."
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For goals, they postulate "common need" but decline to offer indices
by vhich such need can be identified at lower levels of abstraction or
procedures for detailed clarification in particular instances. Unwilling
t confront the difficulties of a genuinely contextual approach, proponents of analytical theory seek to substitute for comprehensive sociological inquiry whatever occasional glimpses of reality they can secure
through the peepholes of "linguistic usage." One foremost proponent
of this newer analytical theory, Professor H. L. A. Hart of Oxford, continues to define law as rules but adds a new kind of rules: "rules of
recognition." These rules of recognition are supposed to be able to tell
an observer, or a decision maker, what rules are genuinely rules of law
and what are mere rules of morality or something else. The rules of recognition he offers are, however, but very thin and pale substitutes for
a notion of comprehensive constitutive process.
The unfortunate fact is that the assumption that law is something
autonomous, distinct from community policy, continues to create a
very large desert in our legal thinking in this country. Professor Herbert
Wechsler of Columbia, not long ago published an article,2 the principal
theme of which appears to be that judicial interpretations should be
"principled decisions" in the sense that "in their generality and neutrality" they transcend "any immediate result that is involved." If all
this means is that long-term consequences should be evaluated along
with short-term consequences in choosing among alternatives, it is of
course innocuous. If, however, what it is intended to suggest is that
principles for guiding decision can be formulated which are independent of the immediate consequences of choice, a heavy burden
would appear to be incumbent upon Professor Wechsler to indicate the
detailed content of these principles and the procedures by which they
are to be applied.
BAsIc FEATURF-s OF A POLICY-ORIENTED APPROACH
TO INQUIRY ABOUT LAW

We come now to our fourth major point, the specification of the basic
features we recommend for an explicitly policy-oriented jurisprudence.
These features are implicit in what we have said above, but may now
be recapitulated in a few principal recommendations.
We recommend, first, that a theory of inquiry provide for the
utmost clarity about observational standpoints. Though the scholar,
the official, the member of the effective elite, the advocate and the
2 Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73

HAIW. L. Rrv. 1 (1959).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1966

13

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 5

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
mere community member may all require the same information and
find it necessary to engage in comparable intellectual tasks, their pur.
poses and social roles, it must be emphasized, are quite distinct. The
primary concern of the scholar is, as already indicated, for enlighten.
ment about the aggregate interrelationships of authoritative decision
and other aspects of a community process. True, the scholar may on
occasion employ the enlightenment he obtains in the performance of
roles, such as intelligence-gathering and recommendation, in authoritative decision, but if he permits the perspectives which are part of the
data he is observing to be substituted for, or to dominate, his own
perspectives, the consequence can only be confusion or loss of enlightenment.
We recommend, second, the delimitation of a focus of inquiry which
locates authoritative decision in the largest community process which
it affects and is affected by. The achievement of so comprehensive a
location will require:
1. A balanced emphasis in the conception of law upon both perspectives and operations, upon rules and actual choices made and enforced.
2. Clarity in distinguishing between patterns of authority and patterns of control in community process, and an adequate emphasis upon
both in inquiry.
3. The conception of law not merely as decision, but as a process of
authoritative decision, which includes both constitutive and particular
public order decisions.
4. The relation of processes of authoritative decision within any
particular community to the whole social process of that community,
noting both what events give rise to claims to authoritative decision
and what the consequences of decision are for future social process.
5. The relation of decisions within any particular community to the
whole complex of interpenetrating communities (from local through
regional to global) which reciprocally affect each other in the largest
earth-space community.
We recommend, third, in lieu of the logical derivation which characterizes so much jurisprudential writing, the performance in the most
systematic, disciplined, and contextual manner possible of a wide range
of policy-relevant intellectual tasks. By the word "contextual" we wish
to emphasize that the rational performance of any particular task requires, not merely the careful location of specific problems in community process, but also the systematic testing of the findings and formulations achieved by the task immediately being performed against the
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findings and formulations achieved by performance of all the other
tasks. The specific tasks which we recommend as policy-relevant include:
1. The clarification of goals. The procedures preferred include systematic statements with reference to the entire community process
and detailed specifications which are disciplined in particular
contexts by empirical observation and analysis.
2. The description of past trends in decision. The categories recommended both relate decisions to social process events and characterize decisions for their approximations to clarified goal values.
3. The analysis of conditions affecting decision. Attention is given
to the formulation of comprehensive theories designed to explain
decision, and both intensive and extensive procedures are employed in the study of such explanatory factors as culture, class,
interest, personality, and exposure to crisis.
4. The projection of future trends in decision. The simple extrapolations of conventional theory are critically assessed in the light
of available scientific findings and other bases of inference.
5. The invention and evaluation of policy alternatives. The cultivation of creativity and the invention and evaluation of policy alternatives are explicitly encouraged.
We recommend, fourth, the deliberate postulation-without regard
for the many possible derivations from the premises of religion, history,
metaphysics, and science that might be invoked for their justificationof a comprehensive set of goal values for the guidance of inquiry. For
every observer the appropriate question is: What values is he, as a
responsible citizen of the larger community of mankind and of various
lesser communities, willing to recommend to other similarly responsible
citizens? For what values is he, as a consequence of all the factors affecting him, willing to take his stand?
The comprehensive set of goal values which we, because of many
heritages, recommend are those which are today commonly known as
the basic values of human dignity. If subjected to the procedures for
clarification indicated above, this high-level abstraction would be said
to refer, at slightly lower level to the greatest production and widest
distribution of all the representative values of our culture. With respect
to power, it implies a strong preference for control by persuasion rather
than by coercion and the widest possible diffusion of power through a
community that is compatible with common interest in the appropriate
shaping and sharing of all values. It would suggest enough concentra-
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tion of power at the center to protect the whole, but enough diffusion
to the provinces, the peripheries, to protect freedom. With respect to
wealth, it implies a balance in governmental and private control over
resources, which precludes a monopolization of power, and the widest
possible distribution of goods and services in a community. With regard
to the value "respect," it requires an absence of discriminations irrelevant to capabilities and positive measures to reward contribution.
And so on for every representative value. The more detailed specification of the reference of any particular value demand would in every
particular context depend upon the effective performance of all the
various intellectual tasks, outlined above, in relation to all the significant features of that context.
We recommend, fifth and finally, an organization of both comprehensive inquiry and particular studies in social process terms which
would facilitate the more adequate performance of the various relevant
intellectual tasks with respect to the insistent problems of our time.
This would require the construction of our research programs and
teaching curricula in terms of community power processes (global,
hemispheric, regional, and local) and of protected features of wealth,
enlightenment, respect, health, and other value processes. It would also
require the formulation of more particular inquiries in ways which
would enable them best to contribute knowledge about the more comprehensive processes. This final recommendation is perhaps too complex
to be made understandable by brief allusion. What we have in mind is
in some measure indicated in our published studies of the law of outer
space and of the public order of the oceans.
CONDITIONS FOR PROMOTING A PUBLIC ORDER
OF FREEDOM AND HUMAN DIGNITY

The concluding major theme, to which at long last we come, relates
to the conditions for promoting a public order of freedom and human
dignity. It seems to me that the dominant challenge today to us as
lawyers is not merely to establish some legal order, to make law prevail
over naked force, but rather to establish a public order of freedom, a
public order in which all the basic goal values of human dignity may
be sought in security and with abundance. I would state also that the
most effective way in which we can meet this challenge is by seeking
to affect the hearts and minds of men-by changing the fundamental
perspectives, the more basic demands, identifications, and expectations,
of the people who maintain our processes of authoritative decision and
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determine the content of our public order. We all know today that the
raw facts of nature, our cultural environment, and even the technological changes which overwhelm us have no meaning except through the
subjectivities of human beings: the demands they make for values, the
identifications they do or do not make with fellow human beings, and
the realism with which they understand the conditions which affect
them. The question is how the appropriate perspectives can be created
and nurtured in the effective leaders who shape our future.
The role of the scholarly observer in seeking to create appropriate
perspectives in our time of crisis is explicit in all that has been said
above. His task is, by employing an appropriate jurisprudence and all
the findings and procedures of contemporary science, to enlarge his
community's enlightenment about the interrelations of its law and
public order and about how these can be changed for closer approximation to demanded goals.
The role of the lawyer-the established decision-maker, the advocate
-who is a more active participant in his community's power processes
may require further mention. In sum, his responsibility is of course that
of asserting leadership in the establishment and maintenance of processes of authoritative decision adequate to secure our preferred public
order. In detail, the economy and effectiveness with which he performs
this over-all role must depend upon the degree to which he understands
the potential, and necessary, creativity in his task.
Let me be specific by reference to problems in constitutional interpretation. As a Mississippian, a teacher in a national law school, and
an observer primarily concerned with international law, I hope that I
can take a somewhat objective view of these grave problems which cut
so deeply into our future. Certainly I would not want to underestimate
their delicacy or complexity. Beset as we are by mounting external
threats and deep internal conflicts, not merely the kind of public order
we can achieve but even our very survival, may depend upon the wisdom with which these problems can be resolved. The point I would
emphasize, however, is that our inherited constitutional doctrine imposes upon us no rigid, automatic solutions to these problems: every
interpreter confronted with one of these problems must make a creative
choice; the critical issue is with what enlightenment about the requirements of common interest he makes this choice.
An analogy to the interpretation of international agreements may
help to clarify the point. Two colleagues, a political scientist and a
psychologist, and I have been studying the large body of our inherited
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principles for the interpretation of international agreements to see if
they can be improved in aid of more rational choice. Looking at the
agreements which are to be interpreted, we find that like most human
communications they are always complementary in reference, ambiguous, and incomplete: the human mind, even when operating in tandem,
does not appear to be able to anticipate the precise flow of future events
and controversy. Turning to principles of interpretation, we find two
diametrically opposed attitudes about their past and potential future
utility: one view is that the task of interpretation is so simple and automatic that one only has to look at the words of an agreement, as Mr.
Justice Roberts suggested we look at our Constitution, to know its meaning; the other view is that the task of interpretation is so difficult and
complex as to be practically impossible and, hence, that principles of
interpretation can serve only to gloss an arbitrary discretion. Our study
suggests of course that the truth is somewhere in between these two extremes. The words of an agreement, oral or written, are seldom the only,
or even the best evidence of the parties' genuine shared expectations,
and principles can easily be devised both effectively to guide interpreters
to many other indices of expectation and to express the relevance, for
supplementing and policing defective expressions, of the basic public
order policies of the community which contains the parties.
It will be recalled that the provisions of our Constitution, whether
taken as a document or a more comprehensive flow of communication,
exhibit the same complementarities, ambiguities, and incomplete references as do international agreements or customary international law.
For supplementing these inadequacies in communication, and in responsible effort to ascertain genuine contemporary community expectation from the whole past flow of relevant communication, an interpreter
is authorized to, and must perforce, have recourse to pre-1787 negotiations, subsequent practice by all branches of the government, statutory
interpretations, judicial decisions and opinions, and the vast literature
of expressions, formal and informal, about preferred public order.
Appropriate principles of constitutional interpretation may of course
aid in the canvass and assessment of all these different evidences of community expectation and common interest, but there would appear to be
as yet no miracle-working formula or computer which can reduce
decision to automatic projection. In the last analysis, the interpreter
must himself take responsibility for a creative choice and be prepared
to relate his choice to the basic goal values of the community he
represents.
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A comparable creativity in decision could equally easily be demonstrated in the interpretation and application of statutes, judicial and
other precedent, executive orders, and customary law. Whatever the
form of prescription, the exigencies of communication and continuous
change in social process make future choice inescapable, and we would
scarcely wish it otherwise. The important concern must be to keep
choice as informed and as rational as possible.
The suggestion is sometimes made that deliberately creative efforts
by judges and other authoritative decision-makers to relate their choices
to fundamental public order goals introduce arbitrariness and uncertainty into decision. Exactly the opposite would appear to be the
case. Every experienced lawyer knows that the rationality and certainty
claimed for decision by reference to allegedly "neutral" or "autonomous" rules are in fact largely illusory. The discipline required in systematically relating specific choices to public order goals by explicitly
stated intellectual procedures might indeed both offer decision-makers
a better guarantee that their choices are appropriately compatible with
the goal values to which they are committed and afford the members of
the general community greater assurance that their genuine expectations and common interests are realistically and consistently being taken
into account. It is upon this latter score, upon the matter of craftsmanship, that I would in some measure agree with those who criticize
recent decisions by the Supreme Court. However rational these decisions may have been in relation to our dominant public order goals,
their rationality was not effectively documented by appropriate procedures and persuasive reasoning. In the field of international law, I
would agree further, this failure in craftsmanship has on occasion produced even demonstrably bad decisions---as in the Sabbatino3 case in
which the Court, creating a new shibboleth of "act of state" as an
equivalent of "political questions," refused to apply customary international law in appraisal of Castro's confiscation of the property of
American citizens.
The conditions of a public order of freedom and human dignity
4
require, in sum, that we all, as so eloquently urged by Mr. Sibley,
strike deep into "the fundamental issues upon which the very essence
of our government rests" and seek to "illuminate and enlarge the
breadth and depth of our knowledge about these issues."
8 Banco Nadonal de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 US. 398 (1964).
4 Address by Mr.John A. Sibley, Introduction to the First John A. Sibley Lecture,
November, 1964.
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